We establish the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibria in general menu games, known to be sufficient to analyze common agency problems. Our main result states that every menu game satisfying enough continuity properties has a perfect bayesian equilibrium. Despite the continuity assumptions that we make, discontinuities naturally arise due to the absence, in general, of continuous optimal choices for the * We wish to thank Mehmet Barlo, Steffen Hoernig and Luís Vasconcelos for very helpful comments. We thank also John Huffstot for editorial assistance. Any remaining error is, of course, our own. 
Introduction
In many important examples in multi-contracting mechanism design, several principals (attempt to) contract with a common agent to influence her choice.
Such a common agency model has been the focus of much of the recent research in incentive theory.
1
In the common agency model, principals offer a menu of contracts to the agent, who chooses one contract from those being offered. Although one could imagine more general communication channels between the principals and the agent, Martimort and Stole (2002) , Page and Monteiro (2003) , Peters (2001) and Peters (2003) have shown that such a procedure of offering menus of contracts is enough to characterize the set of equilibrium allocations. In fact, as points out, "what matters per se is not the kind of communication that a principal uses with his agent but the set of options that this principal makes available to the agent." This result, known as the delegation principle, implies that the common agency problem can be analyzed through a menu game.
However, in order for the delegation principle to be meaningful, an equilibrium must exist. In this paper, we present a solution to this problem by establishing a general existence theorem for menu games.
A menu game is defined as follows. First, the agent's type is drawn from a commonly known distribution. Then, the principals simultaneously choose a menu of contracts (defined as a closed subset of the contract space) without observing the agent's type. Finally, the agent chooses one contract (or one contract of each principal), knowing her type and the menus offered by the principals.
The perfect Bayesian equilibria of a menu game can be easily described by noting that a strategy for the agent induces a normal-form game between the principals. In fact, this is a game where each principal has the set of all possible menus as his own pure strategy set and his payoff is determined by the choice of all principals together with the agent's strategy. Thus, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium consists of an optimal strategy for the agent and a Nash equilibrium for the normal-form game induced by such strategy.
The problem of existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium would then be trivial if there were a continuous optimal strategy for the agent. Indeed, the normal-form game induced by such strategy would be continuous and standard existence theorems would apply. The difficulty with the existence of equilibrium is that, in general, no optimal strategy for the agent is continuous even if the agent has a continuous utility function, a compact action space and a continuous choice correspondence.
Nevertheless, in a sufficiently continuous menu game (e.g., a menu game with continuous payoff functions for the principals and the agent, as well as with compact choice sets and a continuous choice correspondence for the agent) discontinuities can only arise as a result of a discontinuous strategy for the agent. However, such discontinuities create no problem for the existence of equilibrium. Indeed, it follows from the above description of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that we can regard the family of normal-form games induced by the agent's strategies as a game with an endogenous sharing rule as in Simon and Zame (1990) and, therefore, use their existence theorem to establish the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibria in menu games. In fact, a vector of menus defines a subset of payoffs for the principals, each of which corresponds to a particular strategy of the agent. This clearly defines a correspondence from principals' strategies into payoffs as required for a game with an endogenous sharing rule.
In order to use Simon and Zame's theorem in our setting, we need to generalize it along two dimensions. The first is relatively straightforward and amounts to allowing the payoff correspondence to depend on the agent's type. Using an approach similar to that in Simon and Zame (1990) , we show that any such generalized game with endogenous sharing rules has a solution provided that, on top of their assumptions, the payoff correspondence is measurable.
A second generalization is needed in order to obtain a perfect Bayesian equilibrium from a solution. A solution for a (generalized) game with an endogenous sharing rule is a strategy for the principals and a measurable selection from the payoff correspondence such that the strategy is a Nash equilibrium of the normal-form game with that selection as its payoff function. Hence, an answer to our problem can be obtained by addressing the following question: is there a measurable selection from the agent's optimal choice correspondence such that, when composed with the principals' payoff function, equals the selection from the payoff correspondence which is part of a solution? Our second generalization addresses this question, showing that when the payoff correspondence is the composition of players' payoff functions with some correspondence (interpreted as the optimal choice correspondence of players whose behavior is not explicitly modeled), then every measurable selection from the payoff correspondence can be obtained as the composition of players' payoff function and a measurable selection of this other correspondence. Combining our two generalizations, we show that every menu game satisfying enough continuity properties has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
The existence of equilibrium in menu games has also been addressed by Page and Monteiro (2003) and Monteiro and Page (2005) . The main difference between our approach and theirs is that they focus on the normal-form game played by the principals. In Monteiro and Page (2005) , they fixed exogenously an optimal strategy for the agent, and then proceeded to address the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the resulting normal-form game. A similar approach is used in Page and Monteiro (2003) , although there the payoff function used by the principals is defined differently and cannot, in general, be induced by an optimal strategy of the agent. In contrast, we proceed by determining the agent's strategy endogenously, which, as Simon and Zame (1990) have pointed out, simplifies the existence problem considerably.
Due to this simplification, our existence result enables us to dispense with several of their assumptions, obtaining as a result a richer economic model that allows for: (1) non-exclusive contracts, (2) a more general contract space, (3) more general payoff functions for the principals that, in particular, can depend on the menu of contracts being offered and (4) more general utility functions for the agent. Furthermore, at a technical level, our result dispenses with the equicontinuity assumption on the agent's utility function used by Monteiro and Page (2005) . However, in contrast with their result, ours requires continuous payoff functions for the principals (the existence result of Monteiro and Page (2005) allows for upper semi-continuous payoff functions of a particular class).
Our existence result can also be used to establish the existence of equilibria in several common agency problems considered in the literature under general assumptions. This is explicitly done for the retail market model of Martimort and Stole (2003) and the lobby problem of Martimort and Semenov (2006) . The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2.
In Section 3 we provide the generalization of Simon and Zame's Theorem and establish our existence result. In Section 4 we discuss related existence results and show applications of our main result. Section 5 concludes. The proof of some results are in the Appendix.
Menu Games
Consider a game with m principals who can offer contracts to a single agent.
The set of contracts that principal i can offer is denoted by K i and we assume that:
Each principal offers a menu of contracts to the agent. A menu of contracts for principal i ∈ I = {1, . . . , m} is just a nonempty closed subset C i of K i .
In Martimort and Stole (2002) for example, the set of contracts that a principal can offer equals the set of probability measures over the allocations controlled by him. Under the assumption that the set of these allocations is finite, it follows that each principal's contract space is compact. They allow each principal i to offer a mechanism to the agent, consisting of a message space M i and an outcome function g i :
Thus, in this setting, assuming that menus are closed subsets of K i amounts to assuming that principals use mechanisms with compact message spaces and continuous outcome functions.
Let P i be the collection of all nonempty, closed subsets of K i . It is well known that P i is a compact metric space when endowed with the Hausdorff metric. Let P = P 1 × · · · × P m and C = (C 1 , . . . , C m ) denote a profile of menus.
Let K denote the pure action space of the agent and k denote a generic element of K. We assume that:
Assumption 2 K is a compact metric space.
There are two particular cases for K in which we are interested. One, considered in Page and Monteiro (2003) 
where I = {1, . . . , m}. Here, the agent chooses the principal with whom she wishes to contract and chooses one contract from this principal. Implicitly, the assumption is that contracts are exclusive.
A second particular case, considered in Martimort and Stole (2002) , is
In this case, contracts are not exclusive, and so the agent can choose a contract from each principal.
These two cases can be combined in a hybrid model in which the agent chooses an exclusive principal within several sub-groups of principals. For example, the agent may have to choose one exclusive electricity company out of two such companies but chooses to contract with all cell phone companies.
Formally, the hybrid model is defined by a partition {I n } N n=1 of I and by
The agent's payoff depends on her type. The set of agent's types is denoted by T and we assume that:
Assumption 3 T is a Polish space, i.e., T is a complete separable metric space.
We endow T with its Borel σ -algebra and let µ describe the probability measure on the set of types. The agent's problem is as follows. Knowing t ∈ T and given a menu profile C offered by the principals, she can choose a mixed strategy over K. A mixed strategy is a Borel probability measure on K and we let ∆(K) denote the space of all such probability measures. The set of available mixed 2 In all the above models, we can let some f ∈ K i denote no contracting, following Page and Monteiro (2003) .
3 Throughout the paper, we endow all metric spaces we consider with their Borel σ -algebra. Therefore, we abbreviate Borel-measurable by measurable. strategies is described by a nonempty compact convex set ϕ(t, C) ⊆ ∆(K).
Furthermore, we assume that:
The idea behind the constraint correspondence ϕ is that the agent can choose only from among the contracts being offered, i.e., she can only choose a contract f i ∈ C i from principal i. Therefore, we have three possible specifications for ϕ corresponding to the above particular cases for K:
in the exclusivity case,
in the non-exclusivity case and Hence, given t ∈ T and C ∈ P , the agent's problem is
Let Λ : T × P ⇒ ∆(K) denote the correspondence of optimal choices. A strategy for the agent is then a measurable function σ : T × P → ∆(K), and, clearly, σ is an optimal strategy if and only if it is a selection of Λ.
We now turn to the principals' problem. Principals choose simultaneously.
For all i ∈ I, principal i's choice set is ∆(P i ), the set of mixed strategies on P i , and his payoff function is denoted by π i : T × P × K → R. We assume:
Note that in the above formalization we allow each principal's payoff to depend on the type t of the agent, on the choice k of the agent and also on the contracts C that he and the other principals have offered. A possible justification for the dependence of a principal's payoff on the contracts being offered include the cost of writing each contract (so the payoff of principal i decreases with the cardinality of C i ). It is important to note that the delegation principle of Martimort and Stole (2002) and Page and Monteiro (2003) extends to this more general framework, as can be easily verified, implying that menu games are still appropriate for analyzing common agency problems in which such dependence holds.
If the principals offer a menu C = (C 1 , . . . , C m ) ∈ P and the agent uses a strategy σ :
Since σ is measurable, then so is the real-valued function F i on T ×P . Finally, if principals choose strategies α = (α 1 , . . . , α m ) and the agent chooses a strategy σ,
denotes principal i's payoff.
A menu game is then described by
and G H to denote particular menu games for the corresponding choices of K and ϕ mentioned above.
As in Martimort and Stole (2002) , we consider the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of a menu game G. A strategy (α, σ) is a PBE of a menu game G if and only if 1. σ is a measurable selection of Λ and
Thus, in a PBE of G, the agent optimizes for all possible types and menus offered, and each principal optimizes given the strategy of the other principals and the strategy of the agent.
Equivalently, we can describe a PBE in the following way: a strategy (α, σ) is a PBE if σ is an optimal strategy for the agent and α is a Nash equilibrium of the (possibly discontinuous) normal-form game
This alternative description of a PBE allows us to easily explain the difference between the approach we use to establish the existence of a PBE in menu games and that of Monteiro and Page (2005) . While those authors fix an optimal strategy for the agent and then look for a Nash equilibrium for the induced normal-form game, we determine simultaneously both the agent's optimal strategy and a Nash equilibrium of the game it induces.
Existence of Equilibrium
Our main result is the following existence theorem.
Theorem 1 A PBE exists for all menu games G satisfying assumptions 1 -6.
Since the frameworks of Page and Monteiro (2003) and Martimort and Stole (2002) are particular cases of ours, we have the following corollary.
and G
M S
satisfying assumptions 1 -6 have a PBE.
In order to establish Theorem 1 we first generalize the theorem in Simon and Zame (1990) by allowing the payoff correspondence to depend on the agent's type. We then use this result to prove the existence of a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in any continuous menu game. This last argument uses Lemma 2, below, which shows how to obtain a perfect Bayesian equilibrium from a solution of a (generalized) game with an endogenous sharing rule. and compact values and is upper hemi-continuous in C for all t ∈ T (i.e.,
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C → Q(t, C) is upper hemi-continuous for all t ∈ T ).
A solution for G is a pair (q, α) such that q is a measurable selection of
for all i and all β i ∈ ∆(P i ).
Theorem 2 A solution exists for all generalized games with an endogenous
sharing rule.
The proof of Theorem 2 follows closely the one in Simon and Zame (1990) and is presented in Appendix A.1.
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds as follows: first, we define a generalized game with an endogenous sharing rule, essentially, defining the payoff correspondence by composing principals' payoff functions with the optimal choice correspondence of the agent. We then use Theorem 2 to obtain a solution to that generalized game with an endogenous sharing rule. Then, we use Lemma 2 to show that the measurable selection from the payoff correspondence can be written as the composition between the principals' payoff function and a measurable selection from the agent's optimal choice correspondence (i.e., an optimal strategy for the agent). Finally, we show that this strategy together with the principals' strategies that are part of the solution for the generalized game with an endogenous sharing rule form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategy.
Note that if σ : T × P → ∆(K) is a strategy for the agent, then F (t, C; σ) =
h(t, C, σ(t, C)) for all t ∈ T and C ∈ P . Also, note that (C, λ) → h(t, C, λ) is continuous and t → h(t, C, λ)
is measurable. Hence, by Aliprantis and Border (1999, Lemma 4.50, p. 151) , h is (jointly) measurable since P × ∆(K) is a compact metric space.
Furthermore, letting S = T × P , h : S × ∆(K) → R is measurable in s = (t, C) and continuous in λ, and so a Carathéodory function (although h satisfies additional properties, this suffices to prove Theorem 1). Define
Lemma 1 
In order to obtain a perfect Bayesian equilibrium from the solution (q, α),
we use the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let S be a measurable space, X be a compact metric space, g :
a Carathéodory function and Θ : S ⇒ X a compact valued, measurable correspondence.
for all s ∈ S and q is a measurable selection of Q, then there exists a mea-
Since T × P is a measurable space, ∆(K) is a compact metric space and Λ is compact valued and measurable, then by Lemma 2, there exists a measurable selection σ from Λ such that q(t, C) = h (t, C, σ(t, C) ) for all t ∈ T and C ∈ P . Hence,
for all i and all β i ∈ ∆(P i ). It then follows that (α, σ) is a PBE of G.
Related Literature and Applications
In this section we formally relate Theorem 1 with the existence results of Page and Monteiro (2003) and Monteiro and Page (2005) . We also derive from Theorem 1 a general existence result for the retail market and lobby models of Martimort and Stole (2003) and Martimort and Semenov (2006) , respectively. Page and Monteiro (2003) assume that each principal believes that the agent will choose the best contract from his point of view from among those that are optimal for her. Formally, for all
Page and Monteiro (2003)
when the agent's type is t ∈ T and the principals choose C ∈ P . Finally, principal i's payoff function F
P M i
: P → R is the expected value of π * :
A Page-Monteiro equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the normal-form game played by the principals, each of whom, has P i as his pure strategy set and F
as his payoff function. That is, a Page-Monteiro equilibrium
In this definition, principals' beliefs are irrational in the sense that, in general, there is no agent's strategy that justifies those beliefs. Hence, one can find Page-Monteiro equilibria that fail to be a PBE.
For example, suppose that there is just one possible type for the agent (because of this we omit the dependence on t). There are two principals, each with two possible contracts: f 1 and f 2 . We assume that the agent preferences are such that she is indifferent about which principal she accepts the contract from and she prefers contract f 1 to contract f 2 . Regarding principals, we assume that the payoff is zero in case of no contract:
Furthermore, we assume that, for each principal, contract 2 is more profitable than contract 1, which, nevertheless, is strictly positive:
Specifically, we assume that π i (i, f 2 ) = 3/2 and π i (i, f 1 ) = 1.
In the case of this example, one easily sees that C * = ({f 2 }, {f 2 }) is a Page-Monteiro equilibrium for the menu game: the only alternative to
The reason why C * is a Page-Monteiro equilibrium is that both principals believe that he will be chosen by the agent. Of course, only one can be chosen.
Thus, the one who is chosen with a smaller probability prefers to receive the low payoff of contract f 1 for certain by offering it rather than receiving the high payoff of contract f 2 with a small probability. Hence C * is not a PBE.
More formally, we claim that there is no strategy σ : P → ∆(K) for the agent such that (C * , σ) is a PBE equilibrium. Indeed, suppose that σ is such that (C * , σ) is a PBE equilibrium and let γ = σ(1, f 2 |C * ). Then, F 1 (C * ; σ) = 3γ/2 and F 2 (C * ; σ) = 3(1 − γ)/2, while if principal i deviates by choosing
Hence, there is always a principal that can profitably deviate, implying that (C * , σ) is not a PBE.
Monteiro and Page (2005)
In Monteiro and Page (2005) the irrationality of beliefs is corrected by assuming that the agent will choose an optimal strategy. In fact, each principal no longer believes that he alone will be chosen, but rather that he will be chosen with the same probability as any other principal.
Formally, let for all t ∈ T and C ∈ P H(t, C) = {i ∈ I : there exists f ∈ C i such that δ (i,f ) ∈ Λ(t, C)} denote the set of principals that have offered a contract in her optimal choice correspondence. A strategy σ is a Monteiro-Page strategy if for all t ∈ T and
With the notion of a Monteiro-Page strategy, we can easily relate our approach with that of Monteiro and Page (2005) . In fact, they establish the existence of a strategy α for the principals such that (α, σ) is a PBE and σ is a Monteiro-Page equilibrium. By fixing the strategy for the agent, they then proceed to analyze the resulting normal-form game played by the principals using the existence theorem by Reny (1999) and the main result of Monteiro and Page (2007) . In contrast, we do not impose any restriction on the agent's strategy. This extra flexibility accounts for a simpler approach and several generalizations.
The extent to which we generalize their existence result is as follows.
Regarding the contract space, they assume that Regarding the agent, they assume that the agent's type space is a Borel space, i.e., a Borel subset of a Polish space. Since every measure on a Borel space can be (trivially) extended to the Polish space on which the Borel space lies, it follows that this assumption is equivalent to our Assumption 3.
They assume that the agent's choice set and choice correspondence are
, respectively. It is also assumed that the agent's utility function v : K → R has the following particular form:
where (a) for each t ∈ T , (i, x) → u(t, i, x) is continuous in (i, x) and for each (i, x) ∈ I × Y , t → u(t, i, x) measurable, (b) u(t, i, 0) ≤ u(t, 0, 0) for
all t ∈ T and i = 1, 2, . . . , m and (c) for each i ∈ I the family of functions
It is easy to see that our
Assumptions 2, 4 and 5 are more general than these assumptions.
Principals' payoff functions also take a particular form. In fact, for all i ∈ I, principal i's payoff function π i : K → R has the following form:
where I i (j) = 0 if j = i and I i (i) = 1 and the cost function c i : Y → R + is assumed to be non-negative and lower semicontinuous. Note that the latter assumption implies that π i is upper semicontinuous and so, in this aspect, it is more general than our Assumption 6. However, note that although π i can be unbounded in Monteiro and Page (2005) , this adds no extra generality since we can transform unbounded payoffs into bounded ones (see Reny (1999, footnote 8)). Finally, note also that our Assumption 6 does not impose any particular form for π i . In particular, each principal's payoff does not need to be zero if he is not chosen. Moreover, it does not have to equal to his profit when he is chosen.
Retail Market Game
In this subsection, we consider a generalized version of Martimort and Stole (2003) . The principals are thought to be retailers that sell perfect substitutes Assume that there are m principals with
. The choice of k c ∈ K 1 is interpreted as the decision to contract by the agent, while k n means that the agent does not contract with any principal. Thus, we are considering the intrinsic common agency problem. Also, if k ∈ K, then k = (k 1 , . . . , k m ) and
Let Y be the projection of K onto the first l coordinates. 
The agent's technology is described by a bounded Carathéodory cost function c : T × Y → R and her utility function is
Therefore, we allow for multi-goods, in both the final and the intermediate markets and more general cost/production functions, which, in particular, do not have to be differentiable. Despite these generalizations, it follows from Theorem 1 that this model has a PBE.
Lobbying Game
Consider m lobbying groups (principals) that want to influence a decision- for all l = 1, . . . , L, if the agent chooses policy q l , then the principal pays contribution θ l . Thus, the contract space for principal i is
Let J be the set of all subsets of {1, 2, . . . , m} (not necessarily nonempty).
The pure action space of the agent is However, the agent can only accept contributions corresponding to the policy level she chooses. This is used to define her constraint correspondence
the projection onto the lth coordinate and define
The agent's utility function is v : T × K → R defined by:
where C : T × K q → R is a continuous cost function, interpreted as an opportunity cost and V : R → R is the agent's continuous money utility function.
given by
where the continuous function R i : T × K q → R captures the benefit he obtains from policy q and U i is his continuous money utility function.
Finally, we consider the case where principals make a contribution for a global policy. In this case, K θ is a compact subset of R + . The contract space is still K i = K q × K θ , with the interpretation that if the agent chooses q ∈ K q , then the principal pays θ ∈ K θ . Since the agent can no longer accept a contribution for each policy variable, we let
and her utility function is
Finally, principal i's payoff function is
It follows from Theorem 1 that this game has a PBE. It is worth noting that this model is a generalized version of a model suggested by Martimort and Semenov (2006) . This is the case since we allow for many policy variables, more than two principals, risk aversion and more general payoff functions.
Conclusions
We have shown that a PBE exists in all menu games. Compared with the results of Page and Monteiro (2003) and Monteiro and Page (2005) , our existence theorem has the advantage of allowing for a richer economic model, dispensing, in particular, with the exclusivity and the no-fixed-cost assumptions made in those papers.
Our approach also has the advantage of being simpler than the one used by Monteiro and Page (2005) . In fact, they choose an optimal strategy for the agent and then proceed by studying the challenging problem of the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the resulting normal-form game played by the principals. In contrast, we proceed by determining the agent's and the principals' strategies at the same time, in the same spirit as in Simon and Zame (1990) .
Our approach relies heavily on the ideas of Simon and Zame (1990) . In fact, the proof of our existence result is straightforward once we extend their theorem, first, to the case in which the principals' payoff correspondence depends on the agent's type and, second, to the case where it equals the composition of the agent's optimal choice correspondence and principals' payoff functions. This second result allows us to obtain an equilibrium in the usual sense from a solution in the sense of Simon and Zame (1990) .
We hope that these two results prove to be useful in analyzing similar problems, for instance, the principal-agent relationship with an informed principal of Maskin and Tirole (1990) and its generalization to a common agency problem considered in Martimort and Moreira (2006) .
A Appendix
In the appendix, we prove Theorem 2, and Lemmas 1 and 2. Also, we prove that the correspondences ϕ 
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Our proof of Theorem 2 follows the one in Simon and Zame (1990) . Indeed, we start by modifying their Lemma 2 and then proceed by adapting the six steps of their proof to our setting.
Both their Lemma 2 and our version of it applies to vector-valued measures defined as follows. If S is a Polish space, q is a bounded, measurable function from S into R m and ψ is a probability measure on S, define qψ ∈ ∆(S) by
for all measurable subsets B of S.
A particular case is when S = T × P and ψ = µ × α for some α ∈ ∆(P ).
In this case, let q : T × P → R m be bounded and measurable and define
The following lemma considers the above special case and establishes a property of q(µ×α) that is useful in our version of Simon and Zame's Lemma 2. It uses the following notation: if X and Y are metric spaces and ν is a
is bounded and measurable, thenq is measurable andq
Proof. Since q is bounded and measurable, the integral exists. The measurability ofq follows from Fubini's Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 11.26, p. 411) ).
We turn to the second claim. Let B be a measurable subset of P . It follows thatq
Thus, the lemma follows.
After these preliminaries, we turn to our version of Lemma 2 in Simon and Zame (1990). There, we allow for the case where S is the product of a Polish space (i.e., a complete separable metric space) and a compact metric space and Q is measurable but only upper hemi-continuous in the second variable. However, we assume that all the measures involved are finite.
Lemma 4 Let {ν n } be a sequence of probability measures on P converging weakly to ν and let Q : 
Proof. Note that {µ × ν n } converges weakly to {µ × ν} by Hildenbrand (1974, Theorem 27, pg. 49) . Therefore, the boundedness of Q implies, as in Simon and Zame (1990, Lemma 2) , that there exists a measurable function
Since both q and Q are measurable, then H is measurable. In fact, let S = T × P for convenience,
Clearly, f is measurable since q is also measurable. Since Q is measurable, then Q is weakly measurable by Theorem 17.2 in Aliprantis and Border (1999, p. 559) . Then, δ is a Carathéodory function by Theorem 17.5 in Aliprantis and Border (1999, p. 562) and thus measurable since R m is separable (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Lemma 4.50, p.151) ). It follows that the function g : S → R defined by g = δ • f is measurable and that H = {s ∈ S : g(s) > 0} is a measurable subset of S.
Let t ∈ T and H t = {C ∈ P : (t, C) ∈ H}. Since H is a measurable subset of T × P , then H t is a measurable subset of P (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Lemma 4.45, p. 148) ). Since P is compact and c → Q(t, c) is upper hemi-continuous, it follows by the arguments of Simon and Zame that
by Fubini's Theorem. This completes the proof since we can correct q in H, obtaining a function that is still measurable.
We turn to the proof of Theorem 2, showing that the same arguments used by Simon and Zame extend to our setting, with minor changes.
Since Q is bounded, we may assume, without loss of generality, that
Step 1: Finite approximations. Let g be a measurable selection from Q. Recall that P is a compact metric space. As in Simon and Zame (1990) , discretize P in order to obtain, for all r ∈ N, a finite action space P Step 2: Limits. Since ∆(P i ) is compact, then we may assume that Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 10.7, p. 370) ). Then, K × P is a compact subset of
establishing that {g
} r is tight. Therefore, it has a convergent subsequence (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 14.22, p. 488) ). 
We have, therefore, established that, taking a subsequence if necessary, we may assume that {g(µ × α r )} r converges. Let ξ = lim r g(µ × α r ).
Step 3: Selections. By Lemma 4, there exists a measurable selection
Step 4 If X is a metric space and x ∈ X, let δ x denote the probability measure on X degenerate on x. Letting
it follows from Simon and Zame (1990, Step 4) that
Step 5: Perturbation. As in Step 5 of Simon and Zame (1990) , for all
be any measurable selection from Q which minimizes the ith component. Let Y = {C ∈ P : C i ∈ H i for at least two indices i} and define f : T × P → R m as follows:
Since α(
Therefore,
Let
except possibly for
Step 6: Solution. Note that p i i : T × P → R is lower semi-continuous in C for all t ∈ T , as in Simon and Zame (1990, step 6) . Thus, it follows from Fatou's Lemma (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 11.19, p. 407 (14), (15) and (16), it follows from Simon and Zame (1990, Step 6) that α is a Nash equilibrium of the normal-form game (P 1 , . . . , P m ,f ). Sincef = T f dµ, it follows that (f, α) is a solution of G = (P 1 , . . . , P m , T, Q).
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
For convenience, let S = T × P . Note first that Λ is measurable by Theorem 17.18 in Aliprantis and Border (1999, p. 570) and has nonempty, convex and compact values. Furthermore, by Berge's Maximum Theorem (see Berge (1997, p. 116) ), the correspondence C → Λ(t, C) is upper hemi-continuous for all t ∈ T .
Then, Q is bounded since π is bounded and Q is nonempty valued since Λ is also nonempty valued. Since for all s ∈ S, Λ(s) is compact, Q(s) = h(s, Λ(s)) and λ → h(s, λ) is continuous, then Q(s) is compact. Thus, Q is compact valued.
Since Λ is convex valued, then Q is convex valued as well. Indeed, if s ∈ S, x 1 , x 2 ∈ Q(s) and a ∈ (0, 1), then there exists λ l ∈ Λ(s) such that
Finally, we show that Q is measurable. Define Ξ :
We claim that Ξ is measurable. Since Ξ is compact valued, then it is enough to show that Ξ is weakly measurable (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Lemma 17.2, p. 559) ). Let A and B be measurable subsets of S and ∆(K),
is measurable since Λ is measurable. Therefore, if V = ∪ ∞ k=1 (A k × B k ) and A k and B k are measurable subsets of S and ∆(K), respectively, for all k ∈ N, 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Consider H : S ⇒ X defined by
If there exists a measurable selection σ from
for all s ∈ S. So, it is enough to show that H ∩ Θ has a measurable selection.
Note that H ∩ Θ is nonempty valued. This is so because
is a closed subset of X, and hence compact. Thus, H is compact valued, and so is H ∩ Θ. 
Then, f is measurable in s and continuous in x. Note that H(s) = {x ∈ X : f (s, x) = 0} for all s ∈ S. Since S is a measurable space (with its Borel σ -algebra) and X is a compact metric space, it follows by Aliprantis and Border (1999, Corollary 17.8, p. 563) that H is measurable.
5
Then, H ∩ Θ is measurable by Aliprantis and Border (1999, Lemma 17.4.3, p. 560) . Then, H ∩ Θ is weakly measurable (Aliprantis and Border (1999, Lemma 17.2.1, p. 559) ) and so by the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 17.13, p. 567) ) H ∩Θ has a measurable selection.
5 Although Corollary 17.8 in Aliprantis and Border (1999) is stated for the case m = 1, it can be extended to an arbitrary m ∈ N. Indeed, one simply substitutes the absolute value (in R) used in the proof of that corollary by a norm in R m .
A.4 Properties of ϕ
In this appendix, we establish the properties of the agent's constraint corre-
and ϕ
H
. In all these cases, the result is a consequence of the following Lemma.
Lemma 5 Proof. It follows from Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 16.14, p. 530) that ϕ is upper hemi-continuous with nonempty, compact, convex values.
We claim that ϕ is also lower hemi-continuous. In order to prove this claim, let {t n } ∞ n=1 be a convergent sequence in T , {C n } ∞ n=1 be a convergent sequence in P , t = lim n t n , C = lim n C n and λ ∈ ϕ(t, C). We need to prove that there exists a subsequence {n j } ∞ j=1 of indexes and elements λ n j ∈ ϕ(t n j , C n j ) such that λ n j converges to λ.
By Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 16.16, p. 531) , the function Φ from P into the space of all nonempty, compact subsets of K endowed with Since λ(φ(C)) = 1, then λ n j (φ(C n j )) = 1 and, arguing as in the proof of Parthasarathy (1967, Theorem II.6.3) , it follows that λ n j converges to λ. Therefore, ϕ is lower hemi-continuous.
As a consequence, we obtain the following corollary. 
